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" ••• the principle which prompts to save is the desire 
of bettering our conditions, a desire, which, though 
~enerally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from 
the womb, and never leaves us till we go to the grave." 
- Adam Smith (1776) 
savin~s mobilization and capital formation were major 
concerns of development economists until several decades ago when 
these issues were pushed aside by increasing attention to surplus 
labor, to creating new technology, and to transferring foreign 
exchange and food from high to low-income countries (LICs). 
Concerns with savings mobilization have receded so far into the 
shadows that a casual reader of recent development literature 
might conclude credit was the •lll-purpose developmental anti-
biotic and loans ought to be subsidized and savings taxed to 
promote economic and social progress. Currently, most savings in 
LICs are involuntarily mobilized through taxation, inflation, 
overvalued exchange rates, or by tilting terms-of-trade through 
pricing policies (Gurley and Shaw). Collecting substantial 
amounts of voluntary savings through financial markets seldom 
occurs, and savinys mobilization is the forgotten half of what 
financial markets can do in development (Vogel). 
* Ohio State University colleagues, especially Claudio 
Gonzalez-Vega and Robert Vogel, made substantial contributions 
to the ideas presented in this essay. 
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In the subsequent discussion I argue .hat, for at least five 
reasons, mobilization of voluntary financial S·ciVings has major 
import for development: it improves resource allocation, it 
results in more equitable income distribution, it leads to more 
financial market vitality, it dampens inflation, and it expands 
~conomic freedoms. Before discussing these reasons, it is useful 
to outline how rural financial markets are operating in LICs. 
Rural Financial Markets in LICs 
With few exceptions, the amounts of savings mobilized by 
formal rural financial markets in LICs are small. In most LICs 
these savings are a tiny fraction of the total value of agri-
cultural output, make up a small part of total financial savings, 
and amount to a small portion of the funds banks have to make 
formal agricultural loans. Numerous rural financial inter-
mediaries do not offer deposit services, and those that do seldom 
provide attractive opportunities or incentives for depositors. 
In most cases intermediaries are tnainly retail outlets for funds 
provided on concessionary terms by central banks, governments, or 
donor agencies. Interest rates on both loans and savings depo-
sits are often set below rates of inflation so that real rates of 
interest are negative. Even with these low deposit rates, inter-
mediaries usually find it cheaper to draw loanable funds from 
central bank concessionary rediscount linen than to promote 
additional voluntary savings. 
Because rural financial markets are t{pically badly 
fragmented (McKinnon, Shaw), loan ·:ind depo-;it transaction costs 
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for both ~ntermediaries and clients are relatively large (Cuevas 
and Graham}. Th~s, combined w1.th various reyulations, makes it 
d~fficult for intermed1.aries to realize scale or scope economies. 
It 1.s often in their i·lterests to shift some of their normal 
loan and deposit transd.ction costs to clients as ways of 
rationing access to loans or discouraging deposits by new and 
small-account clients. Further, in far too many cases, the loan 
recovery record of the formal intermediary is so atrocious that 
no saver would voluntarily trust his or her savings to the inter-
mediary in the absence of ironclad deposit insurance. 
In part, the lack of concern with mobilizing voluntary 
financial savings is the result of long-cherished assumptions by 
policy makers about rural savings behavior. It has been commonly 
assumed that peasants cannot or will not save in financial form 
unt~l their incomes reach relatively high levels, and that 
interest rates do not significantly affect savings behavior 
(Mikesell and Zinser). The lack of capacity to save has been 
emphasized to the almo-,t total exclusion of the opportunities and 
~ncent1.ves to save (wa~). As a result, low interest rates, 
~nconvenient deposit facilities, and policies that reduce rural 
incomes abound and effectively asphyxiate financial savings in 
rural areas. In the few cases where rural people have been 
provided appropriate savings opportunities and incentives, and 
left Wl.th cash incomes, savings performance, even among the very 
poor, has been remarkable (Adams). 
4 
Wh~le there rnay be Justification for some continued agnosti-
c~sm about the potential capacity of rural people to save, their 
w~llingness to express savings in the form of financial deposits, 
and their responsiveness to interest rates, there should be no 
doubt about the developmental importance of these financial 
savinys. Policy makers have often considered only direct costs 
dnd administrative ease in selecting savings mobilization tech-
n~ques. It 1nay be very edsy, for example, to tax. all holders of 
f~ndncial instruments by inflation, and yet, this may have very 
adverse effects on income distribution, resource allocation, and 
on other important development activities. While it may take 
more patience to mobilize economic surplus1~s through voluntary 
financial deposits, the indirect eEfects of doing so are very 
much worth the effort. 
Sav~ngs and Resource Allocation 
The contribution of financial markets to efficient resource 
dllocation is poorly understood. This is compounded by confusion 
over the term 'funds', which are financial instruments and 
generalized-claims-on-resources, and the term 'capital', which is 
a factor of production. One must clearly distinguish between 
financial markets and the markets for physical goods if the 
developmental role of finance is to be unddrstood. 
A financial market that offers a broad range of loan and 
deposit services plays an important, although subtle, role in 
resource allocation. It does this by tran:Jferring claims-on 
resources among disparate firms and households. Heterogeneity of 
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potential clients of financial intermediaries provides a fertile 
environment for Lmproving the efficiency of resource use through 
reallocation of ceal resources. At any given time some rural 
decision-making units want to borrow resources to act on attrac-
tive consumption or investment opportunities, while other units 
have exhausted their ~~rginal opportunities and have economic 
surpluses. 
Although some reallocation of resources may occur among 
contiguous deficit and surplus units through barter and informal 
financial markets, only a well integrated financial system can 
connect deficit and surplus units over broad geographic areas and 
over long per~ods of time. When financial markets are poorly 
developed or are repressed, many units in the economy are induced 
to consume more or to use surpluses in activities that yield low 
marginal returns. At the same time, deficit units may be forced 
to forgo investments that have high marginal returns or to pass 
up consumption alternatives that might yield substantial addi-
tional satisfaction. When financial 1~rkets are repressed and 
fratJmented by regulations they do a poor job of equalizing the 
tnarginal returns of deficit and surplus units. Some units are 
denied access to loans, others are forced to incur inordinately 
high borrowing costs, others are denied financial savings 
services, and still otr1ers save less than they would otherwise 
because of the low returns expected from deposits. 
A faulty financial system causes inefficient allocation of 
real resources, too much consumption, too little investment, and 
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too little production. Because these inefficiencies occur in 
numerous bits and pieces, they are impossible to aggregate. If 
these losses could be measured their value would likely represent 
ct tnuch larger amount than all foreign aid currently directed to 
1_,1cs. Improved savings deposit services in rural areas of T....ICs 
would help eliminate a significant part of these inefficiencies. 
Savings and Income Distribution 
It has recently been shown that low interest rates force 
concentration of cheap credit into the hands of those who are 
experienced borrowers, those having collateral, and those with 
high incomes (Gonzalez-Vega). Since the benefits from credit 
use, loan default, and the income transfers implicit in negative 
real rates of interest are all proportional to loan size, finan-
CLal markets have a lMjor impact on income distribution when 
interest rates on loans are kept low. This is especially true 
when inflation is important, when serious loan recovery problems 
occur, and when formal financial markets are relatively large. 
A less well recognized result of low interest rates and 
fra9mented financial markets is their concentrating effect on 
income distributions via savings (Kane). Typically, fragmented 
financial markets do little in the way of providing the poor, 
especially those in rural areas, with attractive savings options. 
'I'he divisible and liquid features of financial deposits make them 
a very attractive form of savings for the poor. Since the poor 
<.jenerally have more limited savings alternatives than the rich, 
those with low incomes who face repressed financial markets are 
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often forced to accept a low return on their deposits, invest in 
an activity that yields an even lower rate of return, or to 
consume economic surpluses. Tilose with higher incomes are much 
less affected by repressed financial markets. It is relatively 
easy for them to purchdse land, buildings, gold, lend in informal 
financial markets, or to transfer surpluses overseas. The rich 
find it easy and inexpensive to evade the implied tax placed on 
those who hold financial assets when negative real rates of 
interest are in force. The poor find this evasion to be more 
difficult and co~tly. While the poor only lose modest amounts 
from holding a few funds on deposit at negative real rates of 
interest, their opportunity costs from the lack of convenient and 
attractive savings deposit alternatives are large. 
Cheap credit is no bargain for the poor because they get 
very little of it. The lack of savings deposit services and/or 
low interest rates on deposits are a more direct and important 
imposition on the poor because they have few other savings 
options. 
~avinys and Financial Market Vitality 
There are four ways in which aggressive savings mobilization 
have positive effects on the vitality of financial systems. 
First, if a financial intermediary is highly dependent on foreign 
aid or the local government for loanable funds, the intermediary 
will be very concerned about cultivating the patrons who provide 
this liquidity. This results in intermediaries spending ample 
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tl.me strokin':l central bank, donor agency, and government offi-
Cl.dls, rather than building strong working relationships with 
their own savers and borrowers. This leaves the intermediary 
hil:!hly exposed to political intrusions. Supporting the party in 
power by n~kl.ng politically motivated, noncreditworthy loans 
becomes J.mpossl.ble for the intermediary to resist. If an agency 
mobilizes, from J.ts own depositors, a large part of the funds 
t.t1at 1.t lends, it will be less prone to these intrusions. 
A s~cond, and closely relu.ted issue, is loan default. 
Serl.ous default problems are the common wages of politically 
stdl.ned loans. PolitJ.cal pressure·; also make it difficult to 
collect these loans once they are overdue. In extreme cases this 
111ay turn the intermediary into a dispenser of political patro-
nage. When this occurs, those who have not received political 
loans feel less compelled to repay because of others who default. 
The lack of social sanctions against people who do not repay 
loans made from t_overnment or donor funds <ilso worsens loan 
-.:ollection proble1ns. As loan defaults cascade, the managers of 
the fJ.nancial intermediary increasJ.ngly spend time trying to 
resolve these problems, plus tryin~ to milk additional funds out 
of patrons to sustain lending operations: .-~.gency morale and staff 
efficiency suffer as a result. Locally mobilized savings 
obviates some of these problems by blocking political intrusions 
J.nto the loan-making process, forctng manaJers of financial 
J.ntermediaries to pay more attention to lo1-::al depositors, and by 
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chdn':l~l1<:J the ownershii)-~mage of the funds lent; it is not 
soc~dlly acceptable to steal a neighbor's money in dny society. 
A third contribut.on to intermediary vitality that results 
from sav~ngs wobilizatLon is through the client information it 
prov~des. It is easier for a lender to make lending decisions 
about a potential borrower if that individual has a savings 
account w~th the intermediary. Individual savings activities 
provide the lender with valuable and inexpensive information 
about potential borrowers. Since there are generally very strong 
scope economies in financial intermediation, lending to an indi-
vidual who is also a depositor n~kes good sense for any lender. 
Prov~ding savings deposits can also result in scale econo-
m~es for the intermedi.'iry, and is a fourth benefit. In most 
well-functioning tinancial intermediaries, the number of deposi-
tors will exceed the number of borrowers at any given time by a 
factor: l;;lXceeding 10. If an intermediary does not offer savings 
opportunities, there will be fewer people passing through the 
institutions than if it were to offer these services. This 
l~mited traff~c means that the intermediary has less chance to 
expand the sale of other financial services. Further, a lender 
that provides a narrow range of services is less attractive to 
potential clients. The overall volume of business, and number of 
clients who want to maintain a working relationship with the 
~ntermediary, importantly depend on the range and quality of 
services provided. These, in turn, are very important 
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determinants of loan repayment performance and the average cost 
ot providiny f1nancial services. 
Savings and Inf~~tion 
An add.1..ti..onal reason for mobilizing f~..nancial savings is 
U1at they lessen inflation pressures. If price increases are 
cctused by expansion in money supplies, voluntary savings can 
substitute for some of the 1noney printed for agricultural loans. 
ln at least one country, t3ral{;il, massive increases in funds for 
ctgricultural credit in the 1970s were a signifiqant factor in 
rapid growth of the money supply. In sharp contrast to Brazil, 
the Taiwanese government in the early 1950s pursued a strategy of 
voluntary savin::~s mobilization to control inflation and to also 
provide funds for d::Jricultural lending (Irvine and Emery). The 
'fct1wanese were ve:y aggressive in raising interest rates to 
positive real levels and offering attractive financial savings 
options, especially in rural areas. This form of mobilizing 
voluntary economic surpluses was more popular with the general 
population than varil)US involuntary methodh. With less inflation 
the Taiwanese govern.tlent faced fewer pressures to make adjust-
ments in exchange rates, wages, and tax rates. This led to more 
economic and political stability. 
~avings and Economic Libertx 
'fhe extent of freedom of choice allowed in an economic 
system largely determines individual liberties in a society. If 
coercive methods donu.nate economic choice, individual liberties 
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are severely circuu1scr .bed. Economists and policy makers often 
yive individual lit)ert_~ short shrift in setting development 
policy. This is parti ~ularly t_rue when it comes to choosing ways 
of mobi 1 izing economic surplus•~s and stimulating capital forma-
tion. If a society values expdnding individual freedoms, 
mobilization of economic surpluses through voluntary financial 
savings is preferable to the more commonly used involuntary tech-
niques. ~hile a unit of money involuntarily mobilized through 
taxes is identical to a unit oE 1~ney deposited voluntarily in a 
savings account, their import for freedom of choice is poles 
apart. 
Conclusions 
Capital formed with internally mobilized savings must be the 
foundation of economic development, and in roosts LICs the bulk of 
these savings must come from rural areas. There is no shortcut 
or substitute for this, includLng foreign aid. The pace of this 
torcnation is largely limited by government and donor policies and 
not by defects in savings-consumption proclivities. If Adam 
Smith was incorrect in assuming that most people are born with 
latent savings capacities, then the battle for development in 
most LICs was lost before it was begun (p. 324). A major 
challenge for those interested in stimulating development is to 
select a mix of policies that will result in more savings and 
capital formation and have minimal undesirable side effects. If 
equity, efficiency, and liberty are important social goals, more 
extensive use should b·~ made of financial markets, especially in 
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rural areas, to mobilize voluntary savings. It is worth remem-
berin~ that two of the largest banKs in the world, the Bank of 
America and the Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole were built on 
small rural savings accounts. Rural financial savings do matter 
d!Ki can contribute a good deal more to dev,~lopment if appropriate 
polLctes <ire adopted. 
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